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Background. Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way
that is consistent with one’s preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and
even scientific practices. Prior theoretical research of this phenomenon has mainly focused on its
economic implications possibly missing its potential connections with broader notions of cognitive
science.
Methodology/Principal Findings. We formulate a (non-Bayesian) model for revising subjective
probabilistic opinion of a confirmationally-biased agent in the light of a persuasive opinion. The
revision rule ensures that the agent does not react to persuasion that is either far from his current
opinion or coincides with it. We demonstrate that the model accounts for the basic phenomenology
of the social judgment theory, and allows to study various phenomena such as cognitive dissonance
and boomerang effect. The model also displays the order of presentation effect—when consecutively
exposed to two opinions, the preference is given to the last opinion (recency) or the first opinion
(primacy)—and relates recency to confirmation bias. Finally, we study the model in the case of
repeated persuasion and analyze its convergence properties.
Conclusions. The standard Bayesian approach to probabilistic opinion revision is inadequate
for describing the observed phenomenology of persuasion process. The simple non-Bayesian model
proposed here does agree with this phenomenology and is capable of reproducing a spectrum of effects
observed in psychology: primacy-recency phenomenon, boomerang effect and cognitive dissonance.
We point out several limitations of the model that should motivate its future development.
Introduction
Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or process
new information in a way that confirms one’s precon-
ceptions and avoids contradiction with prior beliefs [52].
Various manifestations of this bias have been reported in
cognitive psychology [5, 67], social psychology [24, 54],
politics [46] and (media) economics [31, 51, 57, 73].
Recent evidence suggests that scientific practices too
are susceptible to various forms of confirmation bias
[12, 38, 43, 44, 52], even though the imperative of avoid-
ing precisely this bias is frequently presented as one of
the pillars of the scientific method.
Here we are interested in the opinion revision of an
agent P who is persuaded (or advised) by another agent
Q [10, 13, 52]. (Below we use the terms opinion and be-
lief interchangeably.) We follow the known framework
for representing uncertain opinions of both agents via
the subjective probability theory [13]. Within this frame-
work, the opinion of an agent about propositions (events)
is described by probabilities that quantify his degree of
confidence in the truth of these propositions [13]. As
we argue in the next section, the standard Bayesian ap-
proach to opinion revision is inadequate for describing
persuasion. Instead, here we study confirmationally-
biased persuasion within the opinion combination ap-
proach developed in statistics; see [21, 30] for reviews.
We suggest a set of conditions that model cognitive as-
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pects of confirmation bias. Essentially, those conditions
formalize the intuition that the agent P does not change
his opinion if the persuasion is either far away or identi-
cal with his existing opinion [15, 60]. We then propose
a simple opinion revision rule that satisfies those con-
ditions and is consistent with the ordinary probability
theory. The rule consists of two elementary operations:
averaging the initial opinion with the persuading opinion
via linear combination, and then projecting it onto the
initial opinion. The actual existence of these two opera-
tions has an experimental support [8, 9, 18, 72].
We demonstrate that the proposed revision rule is
consistent with the social judgment theory [10], and re-
produces the so called change-discrepancy relationship
[10, 35, 40, 45, 69]. Furthermore, the well-studied
weighted average approach [9, 27] for opinion revision is
shown to be a particular case of our model.
Our analysis of the revision rule also reveals novel ef-
fects. In particular, it is shown that within the pro-
posed approach, the recency effect is related to confir-
mation bias. Also, repeated persuasions are shown to
hold certain monotonicity features, but do not obey the
law of diminishing returns. We also demonstrate that
the rule reproduces several basic features of the cogni-
tive dissonance phenomenon and predicts new scenarios
of its emergence. Finally, the so called boomerang (back-
fire) effect can emerge as an extreme form of confirmation
bias. The effect is given a straightforward mathematical
description in qualitative agreement with experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we introduce the problem setup and pro-
vide a brief survey of relevant work, specifically focus-
2ing on inadequacy of the standard Bayesian approach to
opinion revision under persuasion. In the third section
we define our axioms and introduce the confirmation-
ally biased opinion revision rule. The fourth section re-
lates our setup to the social judgment theory. Next two
sections describe how our model accounts for two basic
phenomena of experimental social psychology: opinion
change versus discrepancy and the order of presentation
effect. The seventh section shows how our model formal-
izes features of cognitive dissonance, followed by analysis
of opinion change under repeated persuasion. Then we
study the boomerang effect—the agent changes his opin-
ion not towards the persuasion, but against it— as a
particular case of our approach. We summarize and con-
clude in the last section.
The set-up and previous research
Consider two agents P and Q. They are given an un-
certain quantity (random variable) X with values k =
1, ..., N , e.g. k = (rain, norain), if this is a weather fore-
cast. X constitutes the state of the world for P and Q.
The opinions of the agents are quantified via probabilities
p = {pk}Nk=1 and q = {qk}Nk=1,
N∑
k=1
pk =
N∑
k=1
qk = 1, (1)
for P and Q respectively.
Let us now assume that P is persuaded (or advised) by
Q. (Persuasion and advising are not completely equiva-
lent [71]. However, in the context of our discussion it will
be useful to employ both terms simultaneously stressing
their commmon aspects.) Throughout this paper we as-
sume that the state of the world does not change, and
that the agents are aware of this fact. Hence, P is going
to change his opinion only under influence of the opinion
of Q, and not due to any additional knowledge about X
(For more details on this point see [3, 41] and the second
section of Supporting Information.)
The normative standard for opinion revision is related
to the Bayesian approach. Below we discuss the main
elements of the Bayesian approach, and outline certain
limitations that motivates the non-Bayesian revision rule
suggested in this work.
Within the Bayesian approach, the agent P treats his
own probabilistic opinion p = {pk}Nk=1 as a prior, and
the probabilistic opinion q = {qk}Nk=1 of Q as an evi-
dence [28, 30, 47]. Next, it is assumed that P is endowed
with conditional probability densities Π(q|k), which sta-
tistically relate q to the world state k. Upon receiving
the evidence from Q, agent P modifies his opinion from
pk to p(k|q) via the Bayes rule:
p(k|q) = Π(q|k)pk
/
N∑
l=1
Π(q|l)pl . (2)
One issue with the Bayesian approach is that the as-
sumption on the existence and availability of Π(q|k) may
be too strong [13, 25, 30]. Another issue is that exist-
ing empirical evidence suggests that people do not be-
have according to the Bayesian approach [13, 61], e.g.
they demonstrate the order of presentation effect, which
is generally absent within the Bayesian framework.
In the context of persuasion, the Bayesian approach (2)
has two additional (and more serious) drawbacks. To ex-
plain the first drawback, let us make a generic assumption
that there is a unique index kˆ for which Π(q|k) is maxi-
mized as a function of k (for a given q): Π(q|kˆ) > Π(q|k)
for kˆ 6= k.
Now consider repeated application of (2), which corre-
sponds to the usual practice of repeated persuasion under
the same opinion q of Q. The opinion of the agent then
tends to be completely polarized, i.e. pkˆ → 1 and pk → 0
for k 6= kˆ. In the context of persuasion or advising, we
would rather expect that under repeated persuasion the
opinion of P will converge to that of Q.
The second issue is that, according to (2), P will
change his opinion even if he has the same opinion as
Q: p = q. This feature may not be realistic: we do not
expect P to change his opinion, if he is persuaded to-
wards the same opinion he has already. This drawback
of (2) was noted in [28]. (Ref. [28] offers a modifica-
tion of the Bayesian approach that complies with this
point, as shown in [28] on one particular example. How-
ever, that modification betrays the spirit of the normative
Bayesianism, because it makes conditional probabilities
depending on the prior probability.)
It is worthwhile to note that researchers have studied
several aspects of confirmation bias by looking at certain
deviations from the Bayes rule, e.g. when the conditional
probability are available, but the agent does not apply
the proper Bayes rule deviating from it in certain aspects
[31, 51, 57, 73]. One example of this is when the (func-
tional) form of the conditional probability is changed de-
pending on the evidence received or on the prior prob-
abilities. Another example is when the agent does not
employ the full available evidence and selects only the
evidence that can potentially confirm his prior expecta-
tions [39, 48, 67]. More generally, one has to differentiate
between two aspects of the confirmation bias that can be
displayed either with respect to information acquiring, or
information assimilation (or both) [52]. Our study will
concentrate on information assimilation aspect; first, be-
cause this aspect is not studied sufficiently well, and sec-
ond, because because it seems to be more directly linked
to cognitive limitations [52]. We also stress that we focus
on the belief revision, and not on actions an agent might
perform based on those beliefs.
Opinion revision rule
We propose the following conditions that the opinion
revision rule should satisfy.
31. The revised opinion p˜k of P is represented as
p˜k = F [pk, qk]
/∑N
l=1
F [pl, ql] , (3)
where F [x1, x2] is defined over x1 ∈ [0,∞) and x2 ∈
[0,∞). We enlarged the natural range x1 ∈ [0, 1] and
x2 ∈ [0, 1], since below we plan to consider probabili-
ties that are not necessarily normalized to 1. There are
at least two reasons for doing so: First, experimental
studies of opinion elicitation and revision use more gen-
eral normalizations [8, 9]. For example, if the probability
is elicited in percents, the overall normalization is 100.
Second, and more importantly, the axioms defining sub-
jective (or logical) probabilities leave the overall normal-
ization as a free parameter [22].
We require that F [x1, x2] is continuous for x1 ∈ [0,∞)
and x2 ∈ [0,∞) and infinitely differentiable for x1 ∈
(0,∞) and x2 ∈ (0,∞). Such (or similar) conditions
are needed for features that are established for certain
limiting values of the arguments of F (cf. (5, 6)) to hold
approximately whenever the arguments are close to those
limiting values. F can also depend on model parameters,
as seen below.
Eq. (3) means that P first evaluates the (non-
normalized) weight F [pk, qk] for the event k based solely
on the values of pk and qk, and then applies overall nor-
malization. A related feature of (3) is that it is local:
assume that N ≥ 3 and only the probability q1 is com-
municated by Q to P . This suffices for P to revise his
probability from p1 to p˜1, and then adjust other proba-
bilities via renormalization:
p˜1 = F [p1, q1] /(F [p1, q1] + 1− p1) ,
p˜k = pk /(F [p1, q1] + 1− p1) k ≥ 2. (4)
Eq. (3) can be considered as a succession of such local
processes.
2. If pk = 0 for some k, then p˜k = 0:
F [0, y] = 0. (5)
The rationale of this condition is that if P sets the prob-
ability of a certain event strictly to zero, then he sees
logical (or factual) reasons for prohibiting the occurrence
of this event. Hence P is not going to change this zero
probability under persuasion.
3. If pkqk = 0 for all k, then p˜k = pk: P cannot be
persuaded by Q if their opinions have no overlap.
4. IfQ’s and P ’s opinions are identical, then the latter
will not change his opinion: {pk}Nk=1 = {qk}Nk=1 (for all
k) leads to {p˜k}Nk=1 = {pk}Nk=1. This can be written as
F [x, x] = x. (6)
Conditions 3 and 4 are motivated by experimental results
in social psychology, which state that people are not per-
suaded by opinions that are either very far, or very close
to their initial opinion [10, 17, 69].
(Recall that we do not allow the uncertain quantity X
to change during the persuasion or advising. If such a
change is allowed, 4 may not be natural as the follow-
ing example shows. Assume that P holds a probabilistic
opinion (0.1, 0.9) on a binary X . Let P learns that X
changed, but he does not know in which specific way it
did. Now P meets Q who has the same opinion (0.1, 0.9).
Provided thatQ does not echo the opinion of P , the agent
P should perhaps change his opinion by decreasing the
first probability (0.1) towards a smaller value, because it
is likely that X changed in that direction.)
5. F is a homogeneous function of order one:
F [γx, γy] = γF [x, y] for γ ≥ 0. (7)
The rationale for this condition comes from the fact that
(depending on the experimental situation) the subjective
probability may be expressed not in normalization one
(i.e. not with
∑N
k=1 pk =
∑N
k=1 qk = 1), but with a differ-
ent overall normalization (e.g.
∑N
k=1 pk =
∑N
k=1 qk = γ)
[8, 9, 22]; cf. 1. In this light, (7) simply states that any
choice of the overall normalization is consistent with the
sought rule provided that it is the same for P and Q.
Any rescaling of the overall normalization by the factor
γ will rescale the non-normalized probability by the same
factor γ; cf. (7).
6. Now we assume that the opinion assimilation by P
consists of two sub-processes. Both are related to heuris-
tics of human judgement.
6.1 P combines his opinion linearly with the opinion
of Q [8, 9, 18, 29, 30]:
p̂k = ǫpk + (1− ǫ)qk, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, (8)
where ǫ is a weight. Several mathematical interpreta-
tions of the weight ǫ were given in statistics, where (8)
emerged as one of the basic rules of probabilistic opinion
combination [16, 29]; see section I of Supporting Infor-
mation. One interpretation suggested by this approach
is that ǫ and 1 − ǫ are the probabilities—from the sub-
jective viewpoint of P—for, respectively, p and q to be
the true description of states of the world [29]: it is not
known to P which one of these probabilities (p or q) con-
veys a more accurate reflection of the world state. Then
{p̂k}Nk=1 is just the marginal probability for the states of
the world. There is also an alternative (normative) way
of deriving (8) from maximization of an average utility
that under certain natural assumptions can be shown to
be the (negated) average information loss [16]; see section
I of Supporting Information for more details.
Several qualitative factors contribute to the subjective
assessment of ǫ. For instance, one interpretation is to
relate ǫ to credibility of Q (as perceived by P): more
credibleQ leads to a larger 1−ǫ [18]. Several other factors
might affect ǫ: egocentric attitude of P that tends to
discount opinions, simply because they do not belong to
him; or the fact that P has access to internal reasons for
choosing his opinion, while he is not aware of the internal
reasons of Q etc [18]. Taking into account various factors
4that contribute to the interpretation of ǫ, we will treat it
as a free model parameter.
6.2 Note that (8) does not satisfy conditions 2 and 3
above. We turn to the last ingredient of the sought rule,
which, in particular, should achieve consistency with con-
ditions 2 and 3.
Toward this goal, we assume that P projects the lin-
early combined opinion p̂ (see (8)) onto his original opin-
ion p. Owing to (3), we write this transformation as
p˜k = φ[pk, p̂k]
/∑N
l=1
φ[pl, p̂l] , (9)
where the function φ is to be determined.
The above projection operation relates to trimming
[18, 72], a human cognitive heuristics, where P tends to
neglect those aspects of Q’s opinion that deviate from a
certain reference. In the simplest case this reference will
be the existing opinion of P .
To make the projection process (more) objective, we
shall assume that it commutes with the probabilistic re-
vision: whenever
p′k =
γkpk∑N
l=1 γlpl
, p̂′k =
γkp̂k∑N
l=1 γlp̂l
, 1 ≤ k ≤ N, (10)
where γk = Pr(...|k) > 0 are certain conditional proba-
bilities, p˜ is revised via the same rule (10):
p˜′k ≡
φ[p′k, p̂
′
k]∑N
l=1φ[p
′
l, p̂
′
l]
=
γkφ[pk, p̂k]∑N
l=1γlφ[pl, p̂l]
. (11)
This feature means that the projection is consistent with
probability theory: it does not matter whether (3) is ap-
plied before or after (10).
It is known that (9) together with (10, 11) selects a
unique function [30]:
φ[pk, p̂k] = p
µ
k p̂
1−µ
k , 0 < µ ≤ 1 (12)
where µ quantifies the projection strength: for µ = 1 the
projection is so strong that P does not change his opin-
ion at all (conservatism), while for µ→ 0, P fully accepts
p̂ (provided that pk > 0 for all k). (The above commu-
tativity is formally valid also for µ ≤ 0 or µ > 1, but
both these cases are in conflict with (5).) In particular,
ǫ → 0 and µ → 0 is a limiting case of a fully credulous
agent that blindly follows persuasion provided that all
his probabilities are non-zero. (For a sufficiently small µ,
a small pk is less effective in decreasing the final proba-
bility p˜k; see (12). This is because p
µ
k = e
µ ln pk tends to
zero for a fixed µ and pk → 0, while it tends to one for
a fixed pk and µ → 0. This interpaly between pk → 0
and µ→ 0 is not unnatural, since the initial opinion of a
credulous agent is expected to be less relevant.. The case
of credulous agent is of an intrinsic interest and it does
warrant further studies. However, since our main focus
is confirmation bias, below we set µ = 1/2 and analyze
the opinion dynamics for varying ǫ.)
The final opinion revision rule reads from (12, 8, 9):
p˜k =
√
pk[ǫpk + (1− ǫ)qk]∑N
l=1
√
pl[ǫpl + (1− ǫ)ql]
, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1. (13)
It is seen to satisfy conditions 1-5.
(Note that the analogue of (11), p′k ∝ γkpk, q′k ∝ γkqk
does not leave invariant the linear function (8). First av-
eraging, ǫpk + (1 − ǫ)qk and then applying p′k ∝ γkpk,
q′k ∝ γkqk is equivalent to first applying the latter rules
and then averaging with a different weight ǫ′. This is nat-
ural: once ǫ can be (in principle) interpreted as a prob-
ability it should also change under probabilistic revision
process.)
The two processes were applied above in the specific
order: first averaging (8), and then projection (9). We
do not have any strong objective justifications for this
order, although certain experiments on advising indicate
on the order that led to (13) [72]. Thus, it is not excluded
that the two sub-processes can be applied in the reverse
order: first projection and then averaging. Then instead
of (13) we get (3) with:
F [pk, qk; ǫ, µ] = ǫpk + (1− ǫ)pµkq1−µk , 0 < µ < 1. (14)
Our analysis indicates that both revision rules (13) and
(14) (taken with µ = 1/2) produce qualitatively similar
results. Hence, we focus on (13) for the remainder of this
paper.
Returning to (1), we note that k = x can be a contin-
uous variable, if (for example) the forecast concerns the
chance of having rain or the amount of rain. Then the
respective probability densities are:
p(x) and q(x),
∫
dx p(x) =
∫
dx q(x) = 1. (15)
Since the revision rule (13) is continuous and differ-
entiable (in the sense defined after (3)), it supports a
smooth transition between discrete probabilities and con-
tinuous and differentiable probability densities. In par-
ticular, (13) can be written directly for densities: for
pk ≃ p(xk)dx we obtain from (13)
p˜(x) =
√
p(x)[ ǫp(x) + (1− ǫ)q(x) ]∫
dx′
√
p(x′)[ ǫp(x′) + (1− ǫ) q(x′) ] . (16)
Social judgment theory and Gaussian
opinions
Opinion latitudes
Here we discuss our model in the context of the so-
cial judgment theory [10, 59], and consider several basic
scenarios of opinion change under the rule (16).
5According to the social judgment theory, an agent who
is exposed to persuasion perceives and evaluates the pre-
sented information by comparing it with his existing at-
titudes (opinions). The theory further postulates that
an attitude is composed of three zones, or latitudes: ac-
ceptance, non-commitment and rejection [10, 59]. The
opinion that is most acceptable to P , or the anchor, is
located at the center of the latitude of acceptance. The
theory states that persuasion does not change the opin-
ion much, if the persuasive message is either very close to
the anchor or falls within the latitude of rejection [10, 59].
The social judgment theory is popular, but its quantita-
tive modeling has been rather scarce. In particular, to
the best of our knowledge, there has been no attempt
to develop a consistent probabilistic framework for the
theory. (The literature on the social judgment theory
offers some formal mathematical expressions that could
be fitted to experimental data [45]. There is also a more
quantitative theory [34] whose content is briefly reminded
in section III of Supporting Information.)
Let us assume that k = x is a continuous variable (cf.
(15)) and that p(x) and q(x) are Gaussian with mean mλ
and dispersion vλ (λ = P ,Q):
p(x) =
e
−
(x−mP )
2
2vP√
2πvP
, q(x) =
e
−
(x−mQ)
2
2vQ√
2πvQ
. (17)
Effectively, Gaussian probabilistic opinions are produced
in experiments, when the subjects are asked to generate
an opinion with ≈ 95% confidence in a certain interval
[18]. Now we can identify the anchor with the most prob-
able opinion mλ, while v
−1
λ quantifies the opinion uncer-
tainty.
The latitude of acceptance amounts to opinions not far
from the anchor, while the latitude of rejection contains
close-to-zero probability events, since P does not change
his opinion on them; recall point 2 from the previous
section. One can also identify the three latitudes with
appropriately chosen zones in the distribution. For in-
stance, it is plausible to define the latitudes of acceptance
and rejection by, respectively, the following formulas of
the 3σ rule known in statistics
x ∈ [mP − 2√vP , mλ + 2√vP ], (18)
x ∈ (−∞,mP − 3√vP ] ∪ [mP + 3√vP ,∞), (19)
where the latitude of non-commitment contains what-
ever is left out from (18, 19). Recall that the latitudes
of acceptance, non-commitment and rejection carry (re-
spectively) 95.4, 4.3 and 0.3 % of probability.
While the definitions (18, 19) are to some extent ar-
bitrary, they work well with the rule (16), e.g. if the
opinions of P and Q overlap only within their rejection
latitudes, then neither of them can effectively change
the opinion of another. Also, P is persuaded most
strongly, if the anchor of the persuasion falls into the
non-commitment latitude of P . This is seen below when
studying change-discrepancy relations.
Weighted average of anchors
Next, we demonstrate that the main quantitative the-
ory of persuasion and opinion change—the weighted av-
erage approach [9, 27]—is a particular case of our model.
We assume that the opinions p(x) and q(x) are given as
p(x) = f(x−mP), p(x) = g(x−mQ), (20)
f ′(0) ≡ df/dx|x=0 = g′(0) = 0,
f ′′(0) < 0, g′′(0) < 0, (21)
where both f(x) and g(x) have a unique maximum at
x = 0. Hence p(x) (resp. q(x)) has a single anchor
(maximally probable opinion) mP (resp. mQ); see (17)
for concrete examples.
If |mP −mQ| is sufficiently small, p˜(x) given by (20,
16) has a single anchor which is shifted towards that of
q(x); see Fig. 1(a). We now look for the maximum mP˜
of p˜(x) by using (20) in (16). We neglect factors of order
O[(mP −mQ)2/vP ] and O[(mP −mQ)2/vQ] and deduce:
mP˜ = (1− αQ)mP + αQmQ, (22)
αQ ≡
(1− ǫ) |g′′(0)|g(0)
(1− ǫ) |g′′(0)|g(0) + |f
′′(0)|
f(0)
[
2ǫ f(0)g(0) + 1− ǫ
] .(23)
Eq. (22) is the main postulate of the weighted average
approach; see [9, 27] for reviews. Here αQ and 1 − αQ
are the weights of Q and of P , respectively. For the
Gaussian case (17), we have
αQ =
[
1 + y
(
1 +
2ǫ
√
y
1− ǫ
)]−1
, y ≡ vQ
vP
. (24)
Furthermore, we have
∂αQ
∂y
= −α2Q
[
1 +
3ǫ
√
y
1− ǫ
]
,
∂αQ
∂ǫ
= −2y
3/2 α2Q
(1− ǫ)2 , (25)
Thus, αQ’s dependence on the involved parameters is
intuitively correct: it increases with the confidence 1/vQ
of Q, and decreases with the confidence 1/vP of P . Note
also that αQ decreases with ǫ.
Now let p(x) and q(x) (and hence p˜(x)) have the same
maximum mP = mQ, but vP ≈ vQ; see (17). Expanding
(16, 17) over vP − vQ and keeping the first-order term
only we get
vP˜ =
1− ǫ
2
vQ +
1 + ǫ
2
vP , (26)
where vP˜ is the dispersion of (non-Gaussian) p˜(x).
Eq. (26) implies
(vP˜ − vP)(vQ − vP) =
1− ǫ
2
(vQ − vP )2 ≥ 0, (27)
i.e. if 1/vQ > 1/vP (resp. 1/vQ < 1/vP), the final
opinion of P becomes more (resp. less) narrow than his
6initial opinion. Fig. 1(b) shows that (vP˜−vP)(vQ−vP) ≥
0 holds more generally.
Thus, the weighted average approach is a particular
case of our model, where the agent P is persuaded by
a slightly different opinion. Note also that our model
suggests a parameter structure of the weighted average
approach.
Opinions and bump-densities
Gaussian densities (with three latitudes) do correspond
to the phenomenology of social psychology. However, in
certain scenarios one might need other forms of densi-
ties, e.g., when the probability is strictly zero outside of
a finite support. Such opinions can be represented by
bump-functions
χ(x; b) = N (b) exp[ b
x2 − 1 ] for |x| < 1 (28)
= 0 for x ≤ −1 and x ≥ 1.
where b > 0 is a parameter,N (b) is the normalization and
the support of the bump function was chosen to be [−1, 1]
for concretness. The advantage of the bump function
that is infinitely differentiable despite of having a finite
support.
For sufficiently large b, χ(x; b) is close to a Gaussian,
while for small b, χ(x; b) represents an opinion that is
(nearly) homogeneous on the interval [−1, 1]; see Fig. 2.
The opinion revision with bump densities follows to the
general intuition of rule (16); see Fig. 2.
Opinion change vs discrepancy
One of extensively studied questions in social psychol-
ogy is how the opinion change is related to the discrep-
ancy between the initial opinion and the position con-
veyed by the persuasive message [10, 35, 40, 45, 69]. Ini-
tial studies suggested a linear relationship between dis-
crepancy and the opinion change [35], which agreed with
the prediction of the weighted average model. Indeed,
(22) yields the following linear relationship between the
change in the anchor and the initial opinion discrepancy
of P and Q:
mP˜ −mP = αQ (mQ −mP). (29)
However, consequent experiments revealed that the lin-
ear regime is restricted to small discrepancies only and
that the actual behavior of the opinion change as a func-
tion of the discrepancy is non-monotonic: the opinion
change reaches its maximal value at some discrepancy
and decreases afterward [10, 40, 45, 69].
To address this issue within our model, we need to
define distance h[p, q] between two probability densities
p(x) and q(x). Several such distances are known and
standardly employed [32]. Here we select the Hellinger
distance (metric)
h[p, q] ≡ 1√
2
[∫
dx[
√
p(x)−
√
q(x) ]2
]1/2
, (30)
=
[
1−
∫
dx
√
p(x)q(x)
]1/2
. (31)
Since
√
p(x) is a unit vector in the ℓ2 norm, Eq. (30)
relates to the Euclidean (ℓ2-norm) distance. It is appli-
cable to discrete probabilities by changing the integral in
(30, 31) to sum. For Gaussian opinions (17) we obtain
h[p, q] =
1− [(vQvP)1/2vQ+vP
2
]1/2
e
−
(mQ−mP )
2
4(vQ+vP )
1/2 . (32)
A virtue of the Hellinger distance is that it is a measure
of overlap between the two densities; see (31). We
stress, however, that there are other well-known distances
measures in statistics [32]. All results obtained below via
the Hellinger distance will be checked with one additional
metric, the total variation (ℓ1-norm distance):
δ[p, q] =
1
2
∫
dx | p(x)− q(x) | . (33)
(To motivate the choice of (33), let us recall two im-
portant variational features of this distance [32]: (1)
δ[p, q] = maxΩ∈R1
∣∣∫
Ω dx(p(x) − q(x))
∣∣. (2) Define two
(generally dependent) random variables X,Y with joint
probability density g(x, y) such that
∫
dx g(x, y) = q(y),∫
dy g(x, y) = p(x). Now it holds that δ[p, q] =
min [Pr(X 6= Y )], where Pr(X 6= Y ) = 1 − ∫ dx g(x, x),
and the minimization is taken over all g(x, y) with fixed
marginals equal to p(x) and q(y), respectively.)
The opinion change is characterized by the Hellinger
distance h[p, p˜] between the initial and final opinion of
P , while the discrepancy is quantified by the Hellinger
distance h[p, q] between the initial opinion of P and the
persuading opinion. For concreteness we assume that the
opinion strengths 1/vP and 1/vQ are fixed. Then h[p, q]
reduces to the distance m = |mP − mQ| between the
anchors (peaks of p(x) and q(x)); see (32).
Fig. 3(a) shows that the change h[p, p˜] is maximal at
m = mc h; it decreases for m > mc h, since the densities
of P and Q have a smaller overlap. The same behavior
is shown by the total variation δ[p, p˜] that maximizes at
m = mc δ; see Fig. 3(a).
The dependence of mc h (and of mc δ) on ǫ is also non-
monotonic; Fig. 3(b). This is a new prediction of the
model. Also, mc h and mc δ are located within the lati-
tude of non-commitment of P (this statement does not
apply to mc h, when ǫ is close to 1 or 0); cf. (18, 19).
This point agrees with experiments [10, 69].
Note that experiments in social psychology are typi-
cally carried out by asking the subjects to express one
7preferred opinion under given experimental conditions
[10, 35, 40, 45, 69]. It is this single opinion that is sup-
posed to change under persuasion. It seems reasonable to
relate this single opinion to the maximally probable one
(anchor) in the probabilistic set-up. Thus, in addition to
calculating distances, we show in Fig. 3(c) how the final
anchor mP˜ of P deviates from his initial anchor mP .
Fig. 3(c) shows that for ǫ > 0.25, the behavior of
∆m = |mP˜ −mP | as a function of m = |mP −mQ| has
an inverted-U shape, as expected. It is seen that ∆m
saturates to zero much faster compared to the distance
h[p, p˜]. In other words, the full probability p˜ keeps chang-
ing even when the anchor does not show any change; cf.
Fig. 3(c) with Fig. 3(a).
A curious phenomenon occurs for a sufficiently small
ǫ; see Fig. 3(c) with ǫ = 0.1. Here ∆m drops suddenly
to a small value when m passes certain crticial point;
Fig. 3(c). The mechanism behind this sudden change is
as follows: when the main peak of p(x) shifts towards
mQ, a second, sub-dominant peak of p˜(x) appears at a
value smaller than mP . This second peak grows with m
and at some critical value it overcomes the first peak,
leading to a bistability region and an abrupt change of
∆m. The latter arises due to a subtle interplay between
the high credibility of Q (as expressed by a relatively
small value of ǫ) and sufficiently large discrepancy be-
tween P and Q (as expressed by a relatively large value
of m). Recall, however, that the distance h[p, p˜] calcu-
lated via the full probability does not show any abrupt
change.
The abrupt change of ∆m is widely discussed (and
experimentally confirmed) in the attitude change litera-
ture; see [49] for a recent review. There the control vari-
ables for the attitude change—information and involve-
ment [49]—differ from ǫ and m. However, one notes that
the weight ǫ can be related to the involvement: more P is
involved into his existing attitude, larger is ǫ, while the
discrepancy m connects to the (new) information con-
tained in the persuasion (m = 0 naturally means zero
information).
Let us finally consider a scenario where the change-
discrepancy relationship is monotonic. It is realized for
mP = mQ (coinciding anchors), where the distance (32)
between p(x) and q(x) is controlled by vQ (for a fixed vP).
In this case, vthe change h[p, p˜] is a monotonic function of
discrepancy h[p, q]: a larger discrepancy produces larger
change. This example is interesting, but we are not aware
of experiments that have studied the change-discrepancy
relation in the case of two identical anchors.
Order of presentation
Recency versus primacy
When an agent is consecutively presented with two
persuasive opinions, his final opinion is sensitive to the
order of presentation [10, 13, 25, 34, 35, 50, 52]. While
the existence of this effect is largely established, its direc-
tion is a more convoluted matter. (Note that the order of
presentation effect is not predicted by the Bayesian ap-
proach; see (2).) Some studies suggest that the first opin-
ion matters more (primacy effect), whereas other stud-
ies advocate that the last interaction is more important
(recency effect). While it is not completely clear which
experimentally (un)controlled factors are responsible for
primacy and recency, there is a widespread tendency of
relating the primacy effect to confirmation bias [13, 52].
This relation involves a qualitative argument that we
scrutinize below.
We now define the order of presentation effect in our
situation. The agent P interacts first with Q (with prob-
ability density q(x)), then with Q′ with probability den-
sity q′(x). To ensure that we compare only the order
of Q and Q′ and not different magnitudes of influences
coming from them, we take both interactions to have the
same parameter 0 < ǫ < 1. Moreover, we make Q and Q′
symmetric with respect to each other and with respect
to P , e.g. if p(x), q(x) and q′(x) are given by (17) we
assume
vQ′ = vQ, mQ′ −mP = mP −mQ. (34)
We would like to know whether the final opinion p(x|q, q′)
of P is closer to q(x) (primacy) or to q′(x) (recency).
In the present model (and for 0 ≤ ǫ < 1), the final
opinion p(x|q, q′) is always closer to the last opinion q′(x),
both in terms of maximally probable value and distance.
In other words, the model unequivocally predicts the re-
cency effect. In terms of the Hellinger distance (30)
h[p(x|q, q′), q′] < h[p(x|q, q′), q]. (35)
See Fig. 4 for an example (In our model primacy effect
exists in the boomerang regime ǫ > 1; see below.)
To illustrate (35) analytically on a specific example,
consider the following (binary) probabilistic opinion of
P , Q and Q′
p = (1/2, 1/2), q = (0, 1), q′ = (1, 0). (36)
P is completely ignorant about the value of the binary
variable, while Q and Q′ are fully convinced in their op-
posite beliefs. If P interacts first with Q and then with
Q′ (both interactions are given by (13) with ǫ = 12 ), the
opinion of P becomes (0.52727, 0.47273). This is closer
to the last opinion (that of Q′).
The predicted recency effect in our model seems rather
counterintuitive. Indeed, since the first interaction shifts
the opinion of P towards that of Q, one would think
that the second interaction with Q′ should influences P ’s
opinion less, due to a smaller overlap between the opin-
ions of Q′ and P before the second interaction. In fact,
this is the standard argument that relates primacy effect
to the confirmation bias [13, 52]: the first interaction
shapes the opinion of P and makes him confirmationally
biased against the second opinion. This argument does
8not apply to the present model due to the following rea-
son: even though the first interaction shifts P ’s anchor
towards Q’s opinion, it also deforms the shape of the
opinion; see Fig. 1(a). And the deformation produced by
our revision rule happens to favor the second interaction
more.
To get a deeper understanding of the recency effect, let
us expand (13) for small η ≡ 1− ǫ:
p˜k = pk +
η
2
(qk − pk) + η
2
8
(pk − 1)
∑
l
(ql − pl)2
pl
+O[η3]. (37)
If now P interacts with an agent Q′ having opinion q′,
the resulting opinion p(q, q′) reads from (37):
pk(q, q
′) = pk
+
η
2
(qk − pk) + η
2
8
(pk − 1)
∑
l
(ql − pl)2
pl
+
η
2
(q′k − pk) +
η2
8
(pk − 1)
∑
l
(q′l − pl)2
pl
+
η2
4
(pk − qk) +O[η3]. (38)
Hence in this limit pk(q, q
′) − pk(q′, q) depends only on
q′k − qk (and not e.g. on ql 6=k):
pk(q, q
′)− pk(q′, q) = η2[q′k − qk]/4 +O[η3]. (39)
It is seen that the more probable persuasive opinion
(e.g. the opinion of Q′ if q′k > qk) changes the opin-
ion of P if it comes later. This implies the recency
effect. Indeed, due to symmetry conditions for check-
ing the order of presentation effect we can also look at
h[p(q, q′), q] − h[p(q′, q), q]. Using (39) we get for this
quantity: η
2
16h[p(q′,q),q]
∑
k[qk − q′k]
√
qk/pk > 0, again due
to symmetry conditions.
Note that this argument on recency directly extends
to more general situations, where the agent is exposed to
different opinions multiple times. For instance, consider
an exposure sequence q q q′ q′ and its reverse q′ q′ q q. It
can be shown that the model predicts a recency effect
in this scenario as well. For this case, we get instead of
(39): pk(q, q
′)− pk(q′, q) = η2[q′k − qk] +O[η3].
Note that the primacy-recency effect is only one
(though important!) instance of contextual and non-
commutative phenomena in psychology; see [11, 66] and
references therein. Hence in section IV of Supporting
Information we study a related (though somewhat less
interesting) order of presentation effect, while below we
discuss our findings in the context of experimental re-
sults.
Experimental studies of order of presentation effect
We now discuss our findings in this section in the con-
text of experimental results on primacy and recency. The
latter can be roughly divided into several group: persua-
sion tasks [10, 50], symbol recalling [70], inference tasks
[34], and impression formation [7, 9]. In all those situa-
tions one generally observes both primacy and recency,
though in different proportions and under different con-
ditions [34]. Generally, the recency effect is observed
whenever the retention time (the time between the last
stimulus and the data taking) is short. If this time is suf-
ficiently long, however, the recency effect changes to the
primacy effect [10, 50, 62, 70]. The general interpretation
of these results is that there are two different processes
involved, which operate on different time-scales. These
processes can be conventionally related to short-term and
long-term memory [70], with the primacy effect related
to the long-term memory. In our model the longer time
process is absent. Hence, it is natural that we see only the
recency effect. The prevalence of recency effects is also
seen in inference tasks, where the analogue of the short
retention time is the incremental (step-by-step) opinion
revision strategy [34].
At this point, let us remind the importance of sym-
metry conditions [such as (34)] for observing a genuine
order of presentation effect. Indeed, several experimen-
tal studies—in particular those on impression forma-
tion—suggest that the order of presentation exists due
to different conditions in the first versus the second in-
teraction [7, 10, 34, 68]. (In our context, this means
different parameters ǫ and ǫ′ for each interaction). For
instance, Refs. [7, 10] argue that the primacy effect is
frequently caused by attention decrement (the first ac-
tion/interaction gets more attention); see also [68] in this
context. This effect is trivially described by our model, if
we assume ǫ to be sufficiently smaller than ǫ′. In related
experiments, it was shown that if the attention devoted
to two interactions is balanced, the recency effect results
[33], which is consistent with the prediction of our model.
At the same time, in another interesting study based
on subjective probability revision, where the authors
had taken special measures for minimizing the attention
decrement, the results indicated a primacy effect [55].
We close this section by underlining the advantages
and drawbacks of the present model concerning the
primacy-recency effect: the main advantage is that it
demonstrates the recency effect and shows that the well-
known argument on relating confirmation bias to primacy
does not hold generally. The main drawback is that the
model does not involve processes that are supposedly re-
sponsible for the experimentally observed interplay be-
tween recency and primacy. In the concluding section we
discuss possible extensions of the model that can account
for this interplay.
Cognitive dissonance
Consider an agent whose opinion probability density
has two peaks on widely separated events. Such a den-
sity—with the most probable opinion being different from
9the average—is indicative of cognitive dissonance, where
the agent believes in mutually conflicting things [10, 26].
The main qualitative scenario for the emergence of cog-
nitive dissonance is when an agent—who initially holds
a probabilistic opinion with a single peak—is exposed
to a conflicting information coming from a sufficiently
credible source [10, 26]. We now describe this scenario
quantitatively.
Consider again the opinion revision model (16, 17),
and assume that |mP − mQ| is neither very large nor
very small (in both these cases no serious opinion change
is expected), vQ/vP < 1 (self-assured persuasive opinion)
and 0 < ǫ < 1. In this case, we get two peaks (anchors)
for the final density p˜(x). The first peak is very close
to the initial anchor of p(x), while the second closer to
the anchor of q(x); see Fig. 5(a). Thus, persuasion from
Q whose opinion is sufficiently narrow and is centered
sufficiently close (but not too close) to P ’s initial anchor
leads to cognitive dissonance: P holds simultaneously
two different anchors, the old one and the one induced
by Q.
There are 3 options for reducing cognitive dissonance:
(i) Increase ǫ making it closer to 1, i.e. making Q less
credible; see Fig. 5(b).
(ii) Decrease the width of the initial opinion of P .
(iii) Decrease ǫ making Q more credible. In this last
case, the second peak of p˜(x) (the one close to the anchor
of Q) will be dominant; see Fig. 5(c).
To understand the mechanism of the cognitive disso-
nance as described by this model, let us start from (1)
and assume for simplicity that the opinion ofQ is certain:
qk = 0 for k 6= l and ql = 1. We get from (13):
p˜k =
pk
1− pl + pl
√
ǫ+ (1− ǫ)p−1l
for k 6= l, (40)
p˜l =
pl
√
ǫ+ (1− ǫ)p−1l
1− pl + pl
√
ǫ+ (1− ǫ)p−1l
. (41)
Now p˜l/pl > 1 > p˜k/pk, where k 6= l; hence even if l was
on the tail of {pk}Nk=1, it is possible to make it a local (or
even the global) maximum of {p˜k}Nk=1 provided that ǫ is
not close to 1.
The existence of at least two widely different probable
opinions is only one aspect of cognitive dissonance [10,
26]. Another aspect (sometimes called Freud-Festinger’s
law) is that people tend to avoid cognitive dissonance: if
in their action they choose one of the two options (i.e.
one of two peaks of the subjective probability), they re-
write the history of their opinion revision so that the
chosen option becomes the most probable one [10, 26].
This aspect of cognitive dissonance found applications in
economics and decision making [2, 73]. The above points
(i)–(iii) provide concrete scenarios for a such re-writing.
Repeated persuasion
Here we analyze the opinion dynamics under repeated
persuasion attempts. Our motivation for studying this
problem is that repeated exposure to the same opinion
is generally believed to be more persuasive than a single
exposure.
Under certain conditions (pkqk 6= 0, for all k and
1 > ǫ > 0) we show that the target opinion converges
to the persuading opinion after sufficient number of rep-
etition. Below we also examine how exactly this conver-
gence takes place.
Assume that P revises his opinion repeatedly with the
same opinion of Q. Eq. (13) implies (1 ≤ k ≤ N)
p
[n+1]
k =
√
p
[n]
k [ǫp
[n]
k + (1− ǫ)qk)]∑N
l=1
√
p
[n]
l [ǫp
[n]
l + (1 − ǫ)ql)]
, (42)
where 1 > ǫ > 0, and n = 1, 2, ... is the discrete time.
For simplicity, we assume
p
[1]
k ≡ pk > 0, qk > 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ N. (43)
Eq. (42) admits only one fixed point q = {qk}Nk=1. Sec-
tion VI of Supporting Information shows that for any
convex, d
2f(y)
dy2 ≥ 0, function f(y) one has
Φ[p[n+1]; q] ≤ Φ[p[n]; q], (44)
Φ[p; q] ≡
∑N
k=1
qkf(pk/qk). (45)
Hence Φ[p; q] is a Lyapunov function of (42). Since Φ[p; q]
is a convex function of p, Φ[p; q] ≥ f(1) = Φ[q; q] and
f(1) is the unique global minimum of Φ[p; q]. Section
VI of Supporting Information shows that the equality
sign in (45) holds ony for p[n+1] = p[n]. Thus Φ[p[n]; q]
monotonically decays to f(1) = Φ[q; q] showing that the
fixed point q is globally stable. More generally, the con-
vergence reads: p
[n]
k → ζ[p[1]k ]qk/
∑N
l=1 ζ[p
[1]
l ] ql, where
ζ(x > 0) = 1 and ζ(0) = 0.
To illustrate (44, 45), one can take f(y) = −√y. Then
(44) amounts to decaying Hellinger distance (30). Many
other reasonable measures of distance are obtained under
various choices of f . For instance, f(y) = |y−1| amounts
to decaying total variation distance (33), while f(y) =
− ln y leads to the decaying relative entropy (Kullback-
Leibler entropy).
As expected, 0 < ǫ < 1 influences the convergence
time. We checked that this time is an increasing function
of ǫ, as expected. In section VI of Supporting Informa-
tion we also show that the convergence to the fixed point
respects the Le Chatelier principle known in thermody-
namics [4]: the probabilities of those events that are over-
estimated from the viewpoint of Q (i.e. p[1]k > qk) tend to
decay in the discrete time. Likewise, probabilities of the
underestimated events (i.e. p
[1]
k < qk) increase in time.
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Let us consider the Hellinger distance hn =
h[p[n+1], p[n]] between two consecutive opinions of P
evolving as in (42). It is now possible that
max1≤n<∞[hn] = hm 6= h1, (46)
i.e. the largest change of the opinion of P comes not
from the first, but from one of intermediate persuasions.
A simple example of this situation is realized for N =
3, an initial probability vector p = (0.98, 0.01, 0.01) and
q = (0.01, 0.01, 0.98) in (43). We then apply (42) under
ǫ = 0.5. The consecutive Hellinger distances read h1 =
0.1456 < h2 = 0.1567 > h3 = 0.1295 > h4.... Hence the
second persuasion changes the opinion more than others.
For this to hold, the initial opinion p of P has to be
far from the opinion q of Q. Otherwise, we get a more
expected behavior h1 > h2 > h3 > h4... meaning that
the first persuasion leads to the largest change.
(The message of (46) is confirmed by using the discrete
version δ[p, q] = 12
∑
k |pk − qk| of the distance (33). De-
fine δn = δ[p
[n+1], p[n]]. Then with p = (0.98, 0.01, 0.01)
and q = (0.01, 0.01, 0.98) we get δ1 = 0.0834, δ2 = 0.1636,
δ3 = 0.1717, δ4 = 0.1444.)
We conclude by stressing that while repeated persua-
sions drive the opinion to its fixed point monotonically
in the number of repetitions, it is generally not true that
the first persuasion causes the largest opinion change, i.e.
the law of diminishing returns does not hold. To obtain
the largest opinion change, one should carefully choose
the number of repetitions.
Finally, note that the framework of (42) can be ap-
plied to studying mutual persuasion (consensus reach-
ing). This is described in Section VII of Supporting In-
formation; see also [23] in this context.
Boomerang (backfire) effect
Definition of the effect
The boomerang or backfire effect refers to the empirical
observation that sometimes persuasion yields the oppo-
site effect: the persuaded agent P moves his opinion away
from the opinion of the persuading agent, Q, i.e. he en-
forces his old opinion [53, 58, 64, 69]. Early literature
on social psychology proposed that the boomerang effect
may be due to persuading opinions placed in the latitude
of rejection [69], but this was not confirmed experimen-
tally [40].
Experimental studies indicate that the boomerang ef-
fect is frequently related with opinion formation in an af-
fective state, where there are emotional reasons for (not)
changing the opinion. For example, a clear evidence of
the boomerang effect is observed when the persuasion
contains insulting language [1]. Another interesting ex-
ample is when the subjects had already announced their
opinion publicly, and were not only reluctant to change
it (as for the usual conservatism), but even enforced it
on the light of the contrary evidence [64] (in these ex-
periments, the subjects who did not make their opinion
public behaved without the boomerang effect). A similar
situation is realized for voters who decided to support a
certain candidate. After hearing that the candidate is
criticized, the voters display a boomerang response to
this criticism and thereby increase their support [53, 58].
Opinion revision rule
We now suggest a simple modification of our model
that accounts for the basic phenomenology of the
boomerang effect.
Recall our discussion (around (8)) of various psycho-
logical and social factors that can contribute into the
weight ǫ. In particular, increasing the credibility of Q
leads to a larger 1 − ǫ. Imagine now that Q has such a
low credibility that
ǫ > 1. (47)
Recall that ǫ = 1 means a special point, where no change
of opinion of P is possible whatsoever; cf. (13).
After analytical continuation of (13) for ǫ > 1, the
opinion revision rule reads
p˜k =
√
pk|ǫpk + (1 − ǫ)qk|∑N
l=1
√
pl|ǫpl + (1 − ǫ)ql|
, (48)
with obvious generalization to probability densities. The
absolute values in (48) are necessary to ensure the posi-
tivity of probabilities.
It is possible to derive (rather simply postulate) (48).
Toward this end, let us return to the point 6.1 and
(8). During the opinion combination step, P forms
ǫpk + (1 − ǫ)qk which in view of ǫ > 1 can take negative
values and hence is a signed measure. Signed measures
have all formal features of probability besides positivity
[6, 14, 19, 65]; see section V of Supporting Information
for details. There is no generally accepted probabilis-
tic interpretation of signed measures, but in section V
of Supporting Information we make a step towards such
an interpretaion. There we propose to look at a signed
measure as a partial expectation value defined via joint
probability of the world’s states and certain hidden de-
grees of freedom (e.g. emotional states). After plausi-
ble assumptions, the marginal probability of the world’s
states is deduced to be
p̂k = |ǫpk + (1 − ǫ)qk|
/
N∑
l=1
|ǫpk + (1− ǫ)qk| , (49)
We obtain (48) after applying (9, 10) to (49).
Scenarios of opinion change
According to (47, 48) those opinions of P which are
within the overlap between p and q (i.e pkqk 6≈ 0) get
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their probability decreased if pk/qk ≈ (ǫ−1)/ǫ < 1, i.e. if
the initial pk was already smaller than qk. In this sense,
P moves his opinion away from that of Q. Hence for
continuous densities p(x) and q(x) there will be a point
x0, where p˜(x0) is close to 0. This point is seen in Figs. 6
and 7.
Fig. 6 illustrates the shape of p˜(x) produced by (48)
for initially Gaussian opinions (17) of P and Q. It is
seen that P ’s anchor moves away from Q’s anchor, while
the width of p˜(x) around the anchor is more narrow than
that of p(x); cf. with Fig. 4. To illustrate these points
analytically, we return to (29, 24, 24) that for vP ≈ vQ
and mP ≈ mQ predict mP˜ −mP = 1−ǫ2 (mQ −mP): for
ǫ > 1, P ’s anchor drifts away from Q’s anchor.
Likewise, whenever the two anchors are equal, mP =
mQ, inequality (27) is reversed in the boomerang regime
(47).
Let us now consider the impact of the presentation or-
der under this settings. We saw that for 0 < ǫ < 1 the
model predicts recency effect. For 1 . ǫ we expect the
recency effect is still effective as implied by the argument
(39). However, the situation changes drastically for ǫ
sufficiently larger than 1, as indicated in Fig. 7. Now
the primacy effect dominates, i.e. instead of (35) we get
the opposite inequality. Fig. 7 also shows that interac-
tion with two contradicting opinions (in the boomerang
regime) enforces the initial anchor of P .
To understand the primacy-recency effect analytically,
consider the example (36), and recall that P interacts
first with Q and then with Q′ with the same parameter
ǫ. The resulting opinion p(q, q′) of P reads:
p(q, q′) =
(
g(ǫ)
g(ǫ) + 1
,
1
g(ǫ) + 1
)
, (50)
g(ǫ) =
√√√√∣∣∣∣∣
√
ǫ+ (1− ǫ)√|2− ǫ|√
ǫ(2− ǫ)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (51)
Fig. 8 shows how p1(q, q
′) = g(ǫ)g(ǫ)+1 behaves as a function
of ǫ. The recency effect holds for ǫ < 2 +
√
2; for ǫ >
2 +
√
2 we get primacy. Similar results are obtained for
initially Gaussian opinions.
Thus, in the present model, the primacy effect (rel-
evance of the first opinion) can be related to the
boomerang effect.
We now examine the emergence of cognitive dissonance
in the boomerang regime ǫ > 1. Our results indicate that
in this regime the agent is more susceptible to cognitive
dissonance; cf. Fig. 6 with Figs. 1. The mechanism of
the increased susceptibility is explained in Fig. 6: P ’s
opinion splits easier, since the probability mass moves
away (in different directions) from the anchor of Q.
Let us now assume that P repeatedly interacts with
the same opinion of Q [cf. (42)]:
p[n+1](x) =
√
p[n](x) |ǫp[n](x) + (1 − ǫ)q(x)|∫
dx′
√
p[n](x′) |ǫp[n](x′) + (1− ǫ)q(x′)| ,(52)
where n = 1, 2, ... is the discrete time. Starting from ini-
tially Gaussian opinion, P develops two well-separated
peaks, which is another manifestation of cognitive dis-
sonance: the smaller peak moves towards the anchor of
Q and finally places itself within the acceptance latitude
of Q, where the larger peak becomes more narrow and
drifts away from q(x); see Fig. 9. After many iterations
(≃ 103 for parameters of Fig. 9) the larger peak places
itself within the rejection latitude of Q, at which point
p[n](x) stops changing (stationary opinion). The above
scenario suggests that in the boomerang regime there is a
finite probability that the target agent will eventually be
persuaded after repeated exposure to the same opinion.
Let us mention an experimental work that is relevant
to our discussion above. Ref. [58] carried out experi-
ments with subjects displaying boomerang effect, where
each subject was exposed to sufficiently many different
(but still similar) persuasive opinions. It was found that,
sooner or later, the subjects exit the boomerang regime,
i.e. they start to follow the persuasion [58]. Our set-up is
somewhat different in that the subject (P) is repeatedly
exposed to the same persuading opinion. Modulo this
difference, our conclusion is similar to the experimental
finding: the agent starts following the persuasion with a
certain probability.
Discussion
We presented a new model for opinion revision in the
presence of confirmation bias. The model has three in-
puts: the subjective probabilistic opinions of the target
agent P and a persuading (advising) agent Q, and the
weight of Q as perceived by P .
The basic idea of the opinion revision rule is that no
opinion change is expected if the persuasion is either too
far or too close to the already existing opinion [15, 36, 60].
The opinion revision rule is not Bayesian, because the
standard Bayesian approach does not apply to processes
of persuasion and advising; see the second section for
more details.
The model accounts for several key empirical obser-
vations reported in social psychology and quantitatively
interpreted within the social judgment theory. In partic-
ular, the model allows to formalize the concept of opinion
latitudes, explains the structure of the weighted average
approach to opinion formation, and relates the initial dis-
crepancy (between the opinions of P and Q) to the mag-
nitude of the opinion change (shown by P). In all these
cases our model extends and clarifies previous empiric re-
sults, e.g. it elucidates the difference between monotonic
and non-monotonic change-discrepancy relations, identi-
fies conditions under which the opinion change is sudden,
as well as provides a deeper perspective on the weighted
average approach.
New effects predicted by the model are summarized as
follows.
(i) For the order of presentation set-up (and outside
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of the boomerang regime) the model displays recency
effect. We suggested that the standard argument that
relates confirmation bias to the primacy effect does not
work in this model. In this context we recall a widespread
viewpoint that both recency and primacy relate to (nor-
mative) irrationality; see e.g. [13]. However, the infor-
mation which came later is generally more relevant for
predicting future. Hence recency can be more rational
than primacy.
In many experimental set-ups the recency changes to
primacy upon increasing the retention time; see e.g. [70].
Our model demonstrates the primacy effect only in the
boomerang regime (i.e. only in the special case). Hence,
in future it needs to be extended by involving additional
mechanisms, e.g. those related to “long-term memory”
processes which could be responsible for the above exper-
imental fact. Recall in this context there are several other
theoretical approaches that address the primacy-recency
difference [11, 34, 42, 56, 66].
(ii) The model can be used to describe the phenomenon
of cognitive dissonance and to formalize the main sce-
nario of its emergence.
(iii) Repeated persuasions display several features im-
plying monotonous change of the target opinion towards
the persuading opinion. However, the opinion changes
do not obey the law of diminishing returns, or in other
words, the first persuasion is not always leads to the
largest change. These findings may contribute to bet-
ter understanding the widespread use of repeated per-
suasions.
(iv) We proposed that the boomerang effect is related
to the limit of this model, where the credibility of per-
suasion is (very) low. A straightforward implementa-
tion of this assumption led us to a revision rule that
does describe several key observational features of the
boomerang effect and predicts new ones; e.g. that in the
boomerang regime the agent can be prone to primacy ef-
fect and to cognitive dissonance. There are, however, sev-
eral open problems with the opinion revision rule in the
boomerang regime. They should motivate future devel-
opments of this model. One problem concerns relations
of the revision rule with signed measures that at a pre-
liminary level were outlined in section V of Supporting
Information. Another problem is that the revision rule in
the boomerang regime (and only there) is not completely
smooth, since it includes the function |x|, whose second
derivative is singular. We do hope to clarify these points
in future.
In this paper we restricted ourselves by studying few
(two or three) interacting agents with opinions described
via subjective probabilities. However, these probabilities
can also represent an ensemble of agents each one having
a fixed (single) opinion, a useful viewpoint on subjective
probabilities advocated in Ref. [37]. In future we plan to
explore this point and also address the opinion dynamics
for collectives of agents. This last aspect was recently
extensively studied via methods of statistical physics; see
[20, 63] for reviews.
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FIG. 1: Opinions described via Gaussian densities (17).
The initial opinion of P is described by Gaussian probability density p(x) (blue curve) centered at zero; see (17). The opinion
of Q amounts to Gaussian probability density q(x) (purple curve) centered at a positive value. For all three figures continuous
density f(x) (f = p, q, p˜) were approximated by 100 points {f(xk)}
100
k=1, xk+1 − xk = 0.1. The resulting opinion p˜(x) of P is
given by (16) with ǫ = 0.5 (olive curve).
(a) The opinion of P moves towards that of Q; mP = 0, σP = 1, mQ = 1, σQ = 0.5.
(b) The maximally probable opinion of P is reinforced; mP = 0, σP = 1, mQ = 0, σQ = 0.25.
(c) The change of the opinion of P is relatively small provided that the Gaussian densities overlap only in the region of non-
commitment; cf. (18), (19).
Whenever the densities overlap only within the rejection range the difference between p(x) and p˜(x) is not visible by eyes. For
example, if p(x) and q(x) are Gaussian with, respectively, mP = −3, mQ = 3, vP = vQ = 1, the Hellinger distance (see (30)
for definition) h[p, q] = 0.99 is close to maximally far, while the opinion change is small: h[p, p˜] = 3.48 × 10−2.
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FIG. 2: Opinions described via bump densities (28).
Blue curve: the initial opinion of P given by (28) with b = 1. Purple curve: the opinion of Q described by (28) with b = 0.001.
Olive curve: the resulting opinion of P obtained via (16) with ǫ = 0.5.
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FIG. 3: Opinion change versus discrepancy.
(a) The opinion change is quantified via the Hellinger distance h = h[p, p˜] between the old and new opinion of P (blue curves);
see (30) for the definition. For comparison we also include the total variance distance δ = δ[p, p˜] (purple curves); see (33).
These two distances are plotted versus the discrepancy m = |mP −mQ|. The initial opinion of the agent P is Gaussian with
mP = 0 and vP = 1; see (17). The opinion of Q is Gaussian with mQ = m and vQ = 1. Thus m quantifies the initial distance
between the opinions of P and Q. The final opinion p˜(x) is given by (13). Different curves correspond to different ǫ.
Blue curves: h(m) = h[p, p˜] for ǫ = 0.1 (upper curve) and ǫ = 0.5 (lower curve). Purple curves: δ(m) = δ[p, p˜] for ǫ = 0.1
(upper curve) and ǫ = 0.5 (lower curve). The maximum of h(m) (δ(m)) is reached at mc h (mc δ).
(b) mc h (mc δ) is the point where h(m) (δ(m)) achieves its maximum as a function of m. Blues points: mc h(ǫ) versus ǫ for
same parameters as in (a). mc h(ǫ) grows both for ǫ → 1 and ǫ → 0, e.g. mc h(0.01) = 3.29972, mc h(0.0001) = 4.53052,
mc h(0.9) = 2.94933, mc h(0.999) = 4.12861. Purple points: mc δ(ǫ) versus ǫ for same parameters as in (a).
(c) The difference of the anchors (maximally probable values) ∆m = m
P˜
−mP versus mQ = m for the initial opinions of P
and Q given by (17) under mP = 0, vP = 1, mQ = m and vQ = 1. The final opinion p˜(x) of P (and its maximally probable
value m
P˜
) if found from (13) under ǫ = 0.1 (black points), ǫ = 0.25 (blue points) and ǫ = 0.5 (red points).
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FIG. 4: Order of presentation effect.
Blue curve: The initial opinion of P is described by Gaussian probability density p(x) with mP = 0 and vP = 1; see (17).
Purple (resp. olive) curve: the initial opinion of Q (resp. Q′) are given by (17) with mQ = 1.5 (resp. mQ′ = −1.5) and
vQ = 0.5 (resp. vQ′ = 0.5). Green curve: the resulting opinion of P after interacting first with Q and then with Q
′. Both
interactions use ǫ = 0.5. The final opinion of P is inclined to the most recent opinion (that of Q′) both with respect to its
maximally probable value and distance. The final opinion of P has a larger width than the initial one.
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FIG. 5: Cognitive dissonance.
(a) Blue (resp. purple) curve: the initial opinion of agent P (resp. Q) described by probability density p(x) (resp. q(x)). Olive
curve: the final opinion p˜(x) of P as given by (16) with ǫ = 0.35. Here p(x) and q(x) are defined by (17) with mP = 0, vP = 1,
mQ = 2, vQ = 0.1. The final opinion develops two peaks of comparable height (cognitive dissonance).
(b) Avoiding the cognitive dissonance due to a larger ǫ = 0.75: the second peak is much smaller (other parameters are those
of (a)).
(c) Avoiding the cognitive dissonance due to a smaller ǫ = 0.05: the first peak is much smaller (other parameters are those of
(a)).
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FIG. 6: Opinion change in the boomerang regime.
Blue (resp. purple) curve: the initial opinion of agent P (resp. Q) described by probability density p(x) (resp. q(x)). Olive
curve: the final opinion p˜(x) of P given by (16) with ǫ = 2. Here p(x) and q(x) are given by (17) with mP = 0 and
vP = mQ = vQ = 1. The anchor (maximally probable opinion) of P not only moves away from the anchor of Q; but it is also
enhanced: the (biggest) peak of p˜(x) is larger than that of p(x). The second (smaller) peak of p˜(x) arises because the initial
probability of P located to the right from the anchor mQ of Q, moves away from mQ; p˜(x) gets a local minimum close to mQ.
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FIG. 7: Order of presentation effect in the boomerang regime.
The same as in Fig. 4 but for ǫ = 1.5 (boomerang regime). Now the final opinion of P is inclined to the first opinion (that
of Q) with respect to the distance. The initial maximally probable opinion of P is still maximally probable. Moreover, its
probability has increased and the width around it has decreased. The final opinion has 3 peaks.
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FIG. 8: Illustration of the order of presentation effect in the boomerang regime.
p1(q, q
′) = g(ǫ)
g(ǫ)+1
given by (50, 51) versus ǫ.
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FIG. 9: Repeated persuasion in the boomerang regime.
Blue (resp. purple) curve: the initial opinion of agent P (resp. Q) described by probability density p(x) (resp. q(x)) as given
by (17) with mP = 0, vP = vQ = 1, mQ = 1. Olive curve: the opinion of P after 50 iterations (52) with ǫ = 2.
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